In 2013, when Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative in speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, the world did not quite know what to make of it. Was it a trade route? A development program? A grand strategy to rewrite global economic governance? All three turned out to be true, which made BRI simultaneously everything and nothing.
Twelve years later, in 2026, the debate has evolved but not resolved. The Western framing of "debt trap diplomacy" has been partially discredited by data showing that most Belt and Road borrowing is commercial rather than concessional and that China has repeatedly restructured or forgiven loans when countries faced genuine debt distress. The Chinese framing of "mutual benefit and win-win cooperation" has been partially undermined by the reality that the benefits of BRI projects are distributed very unevenly β between countries, between communities, and between Chinese companies and local workforces.
The truth is more complicated and more interesting than either framing. Here is what BRI actually looks like on the ground in 2026.
The Numbers: BRI by Scale
BRI now encompasses over 150 countries as formal participants, according to China's official count. The total value of BRI-connected projects announced since 2013 exceeds $1 trillion. In practice, the definition of "BRI project" has expanded considerably β it now includes not only roads, railways, and ports built by Chinese companies with Chinese financing, but also digital infrastructure, financial services, industrial parks, and projects co-financed with multilateral development banks or third-country partners.
The composition of BRI has shifted significantly since the early years. In 2016-2018, the dominant project types were roads, railways, and ports β large physical infrastructure with high visibility. Since 2020, the fastest-growing segments have been digital infrastructure (data centers, undersea cables, 5G networks), renewable energy (solar farms, wind farms, battery storage), and industrial parks that aim to create manufacturing capacity rather than just transport capacity.
Case Study: The Standard Gauge Railway Revolution in East Africa
The most frequently cited Belt and Road success story β and the most frequently criticized β is the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, and its extension to Naivasha and onward to the Ugandan border.
The numbers are genuinely impressive by any measure. The railway, built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation at a cost of $3.8 billion (90% financed by a Chinese loan), reduced cargo transit time between Mombasa and Nairobi from two days by road to four hours by train. Freight volumes have grown consistently since opening in 2017, reaching 6.2 million metric tons in 2024. The railway employs over 30,000 people, the majority of them Kenyan.
The Kenya Railway Corporation operates the line with technical support from Chinese companies. This operational model β Chinese financing, Chinese construction, Chinese technology, and gradual transition to local management β is the standard BRI template, and Kenya is one of the more successful examples of the model working.
But the debt dimension is real. Kenya's debt to China is approximately $7.9 billion, of which the Mombasa-Nairobi railway accounts for a significant portion. Debt service on this loan is consuming a growing share of government revenue. In 2024, Kenya sought a debt restructuring under the Common Framework, a G20 initiative for distressed borrowers, and China participated in the negotiations β a sign that Beijing is willing to accept losses on BRI loans when the alternative is complete default, but also a sign that the financial returns on these investments are not guaranteed.
The broader question β whether the railway's economic benefits justify its cost β is genuinely contested. The government projects significant economic benefits through increased trade, logistics efficiency, and the development of a special economic zone around Naivasha. Critics point out that the corridor benefits a narrow slice of the Kenyan economy, that truck drivers and informal traders along the old road have been economically displaced, and that the financial burden may outlast the economic benefits.
Case Study: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at the Crossroads
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship BRI project and the one most frequently cited in the "debt trap" framework, because of Pakistan's chronic balance of payments difficulties and its strategic importance to China.
CPEC includes a mix of energy projects (coal, solar, and wind plants), transportation infrastructure (the Karakoram Highway upgrade, a new motorway between Karachi and Lahore), and a Gwadar Port development on the Arabian Sea. The total value of CPEC commitments is approximately $65 billion, making it the largest single BRI project cluster.
The geopolitical dimension is inescapable. CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which Pakistan administers but which India claims as part of Kashmir. China has a strong interest in CPEC's success for strategic reasons β it provides an alternative trade route to the Indian Ocean that bypasses the Malacca Strait, through which approximately 80% of China's oil imports pass. The "Malacca dilemma" β China's strategic vulnerability if the Strait of Malacca were blockaded in a conflict β is one of the core motivations for BRI's overland corridors.
The reality on the ground is more mundane and more difficult than the strategic framing suggests. CPEC has been slowed by security concerns (Baloch separatist groups have attacked Chinese workers), by Pakistan's political instability (four changes of government since 2013), and by disputes over the financial terms of individual projects. The Gwadar Port, intended as a game-changing logistics hub, handles a fraction of the cargo volume that was projected.
Case Study: Digital BRI β The Undersea Cable Wars
Less visible than railways and ports, but arguably more strategically significant in the long run, is China's investment in digital infrastructure under the BRI umbrella.
The most concrete manifestation is the network of undersea fiber optic cables connecting China to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In 2025-2026, three new cables built with significant Chinese investment came online: the Asia Link cable connecting Hong Kong to Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines; the Europe-Persia Express connecting to Oman and the UAE; and the PEACE cable extension into the Mediterranean.
These cables carry a growing share of global internet traffic, and Chinese investment in them is transforming China's position in the global digital infrastructure ecosystem. Five years ago, Chinese companies were minor players in undersea cable investment. Today, Chinese financing and equipment providers are involved in a significant share of new cable projects in the Indo-Pacific and along the BRI routes.
The United States has raised concerns about the security implications of Chinese-built and Chinese-financed undersea cables β concerns that have some technical basis (the cables could theoretically be tapped or disrupted) but are also partly about market competition. Huawei Marine Networks, a subsidiary of Huawei, is now one of the world's largest undersea cable installation companies. The security concerns are real but must be weighed against the practical reality that excluding Chinese companies from cable projects would dramatically increase costs and slow deployment.
The BRI's Multilateral Turn
One of the most significant shifts in BRI over the past three years is its increasing multilateralization. China has progressively moved from bilateral project financing toward mechanisms that involve third countries, multilateral development banks, and international institutions.
The most concrete expression of this is the acceleration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as a framework for BRI projects in Africa. Starting with the 2024 FOCAC summit in Beijing, Chinese financing for African infrastructure has increasingly been channeled through the African Development Bank and the African Union's infrastructure programs, rather than directly from Chinese state banks to African governments. The result is better project vetting, more local capacity building, and reduced bilateral debt exposure for recipient countries.
In Central Asia, the China-Central Asia Cooperation Mechanism (established in January 2025 as a formal international organization) has provided a multilateral framework for BRI's flagship regional project: the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway. This project has been discussed for over 25 years; its elevation to multilateral status has accelerated progress toward final investment decision, with construction now expected to begin in 2027.
The Gulf Cooperation Council countries have also become more active BRI participants, with significant investment from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar into BRI industrial park and logistics projects in Pakistan, Kenya, and Egypt. This represents a new kind of multilateralism β middle-power countries using BRI as a framework for their own international investment strategies.
What BRI Visitors Actually See
For the traveler visiting a BRI country in 2026, the evidence of Chinese infrastructure investment is increasingly visible β but often not in the ways the grand strategic narratives suggest.
In Kenya, the Standard Gauge Railway is a physical fact of daily life. Its blue and orange locomotives are the most recognizable symbols of modern Kenyan infrastructure. The railway has not, as critics feared, been operated exclusively by Chinese workers. Kenyan engineers and managers have progressively taken on operational roles. The railway is becoming Kenyan, slowly, in the way that large infrastructure investments eventually become national assets regardless of who built them.
In Pakistan, the Karakoram Highway improvements have genuinely reduced travel time and improved safety on one of the world's most dramatic mountain roads. But the highway is also a reminder that physical infrastructure alone does not generate economic development β the areas around it have seen modest economic benefits, not the transformation that was projected.
In Ethiopia, the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway operates under Chinese management but carries a growing share of the region's cargo. It has genuinely reduced logistics costs and improved trade competitiveness for a landlocked country that depends entirely on a single port.
In Southeast Asia, the Lao-China Railway, opened in late 2021, has transformed travel between Vientiane and Kunming (the journey takes about three hours at 160 km/h) and is beginning to show economic effects in the form of increased tourism and cross-border trade. The railway has also introduced Laos to high-speed rail as a mode of transport, a psychological as much as an economic shift.
The Structural Tension That Has Not Gone Away
Belt and Road projects continue to generate controversy because they touch on a structural tension that BRI itself cannot resolve: the gap between China's interest in securing resources, trade routes, and strategic depth, and the interest of recipient countries in developing their own productive capacity, creating local jobs, and building genuine economic independence.
This tension is not unique to BRI β it characterizes all large-scale development finance, including World Bank projects, IMF programs, and American aid programs. But it is acute in the BRI context because of China's scale, speed, and the opacity of many bilateral financial arrangements.
The evidence to date suggests that BRI projects produce mixed results β significant successes and significant failures, genuine economic benefits alongside genuine debt burdens and environmental damage. The countries that have navigated BRI most successfully are those with strong institutions, clear national strategies, and the capacity to negotiate effectively with Chinese state enterprises. Rwanda, Ethiopia (pre-2020), and Kazakhstan are frequently cited in this category. The countries that have struggled most are those with weak institutions, political instability, and limited negotiating capacity.
This is, ultimately, not a story about China. It is a story about development β about the conditions under which large infrastructure investments produce lasting economic benefits, and about who bears the risks when they do not.